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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Defendant/Appellant appeals from rulings made preliminary to 
and at the course of a trial held in the Sixth Judicial District 
Court for Wayne County which resulted in a jury verdict on February 
27, 1989, and from the Denial of the following Post-trial Motions: 
(1) Motion for New Trial - Filed April 18, 1989, and 
the Order denying said Motion entered on July 14, 1989; and 
(2) Motion in Arrest of Judgment - Filed July 17, 
1989, and the Order entered denying said Motion on July 14, 1989. 
The Notice of Appeal dated July 14, 1989, was filed 
with this Court on September 5, 1989. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal of rulings made preliminary to and 
at the course of a trial held in the Sixth Judicial Court of Wayne 
County, and from a denial of Post-trial Motions. 
Defendant/Appellant was charged with 8 separate counts of theft of 
cattle, and convicted by a jury on February 27, 1989. 
4 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented by the Appeal expressed in terms and 
circumstances of the case are set forth as follows: 
Issue No. lf Juror Bias and Improper Conduct:Should a 
new trial be granted in view of the fact that one of the jurors 
was a close friend and former employee of one of the key witnesses 
and alleged owner of the cattle, and that one of the jurors had 
previously arrested one of the witnesses for an identical offense. 
Should a new trial be granted because some jurors had been seen 
speaking to witnesses during the recess of the trial. 
Issue No. 2, Separate Offenses: Was the fact that 
multiple charges were filed and the Defendant/Appellant was found 
guilty of multiple claims error and prejudicial to the 
Defendant/Appellant's rights in view of the fact that only one 
group of 8 head of cattle were referred to during the course of the 
trial and in the indictment, and that separate elements of intent 
were not alleged or proven, and that the alleged offenses should 
all have been included in one count. 
Issue No. 3, Denial of Equal Protection: Is the 
charging statute, Utah Code Ann. 76-6-412 unconstitutional on the 
basis that it denies the Defendant/Appellant equal protection under 
the law in that it establishes the alleged crime of which the 
Defendant/Appellant was charged as a felony without reference to 
the specific value of the items referred to, whereas the remaining 
provisions of the section require certain monetary limits in order 
to qualify for the various levels of felony convictions. 
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Issue No, 4, Venue: Did the Court improperly deny the 
Defendant/Appellant's Motion for Change of Venue in that all 
residents of the small community of Loa, in which the trial 
occurred, were essentially aware of the case through pre-trial 
publication and rumors which were widely disseminated throughout 
the entire community and county. 
Issue No, 5, Opinion Testimony: Was it improper to admit 
testimony of Clyde B. Argyle and A.C, Ekker over the objection of 
the Defendant/Appellant through his counsel because it was based 
on hearsay, there was lack of foundation, and inadequate basis 
for an opinion? 
Issue No. 6, Business Records: Was it improper to admit 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 into evidence under a business record 
hearsay exception when the only identification of such records 
was by the brand inspector who was not an employee of the 
stockyard and had no personal knowledge of the operation of the 
business? 
Issue No. 7, Requirement of Original: Was it improper to 
admit Plaintiff's Exhibits 3 and 6 for lack of foundation as the 
originals were easily obtainable? 
Issue No. 8, Improper Closing Remarks: Should a reversal be 
granted on the basis of improper remarks made by the prosecution 
in his closing statement to the effect that the 
Defendant/Appellant was not only guilty of this crime but a 
number of other crimes for which he should be punished? 
Issue No. 9,Irrelevant Testimony: Was it improper to admit 
testimony of A.C. Ekker as to previous reports and apprehensions 
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for lack of relevancy? 
Issue No, 10, Sentencing: Was there an improper sentenc-
ing procedure in that the same judge who tried the case did not 
impose the sentence when he either was or would have soon been 
available to impose the sentence. Did the sentencing judge rely 
upon evidence which was beyond the scope which should have 
reasonably been considered in view of statements made by the 
claimed owner of the cattle at the sentencing that rustling by 
airplanes had occurred in the area, that it was a serious 
problem, and that this Defendant/Appellant should be harshly 
punished as an example to other parties to prevent airplane 
rustling? 
Issue No. 11, Insufficiency of and Variance of 
indictment: Is some evidence as to the time of taking required 
to be provided either in the indictment or at the trial so as to 
allow the Defendant/Appellant to be able to defend himself on due 
process grounds, and should the Defendant/Appellant's conviction 
be reversed in the absence of any such evidence in view of the 
fact that the Defendant/Appellant gave evidence as to alibi, 
which imposed upon the state a higher burden than it would other-
wise have had to then come forward with a specific time of taking 
other, than during the period when the Defendant/Appellant had an 
alibi as to his whereabouts? When evidence at the trial revealed 
a corporation allegedly owned the cattle, did that constitute a 
variance? 
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Issue No, 12, Prior Bad Acts: The Defendant/Appellant was 
originally charged with fraudulently uttering and altering title 
to cattle, which charge was dismissed prior to the trial. In 
view of this dismissal was it prejudicial to allow testimony in 
during the trial concerning said instrument over the objection of 
Defendant/Appellant's counsel when there was no issue before the 
court on this question. 
Issue No. 13: With respect to each evidentiary question the 
issue arises as to whether or not the prejudicial effect out-
weighed its probative value and, if so, whether or not the admis-
sion of said evidence was likely to have had a material effect on 
the outcome of the trial. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Amendment V, Constitution of the United States. 
Amendment VI, Constitution of the United States. 
Amendment VIII, Constitution of the United States. 
Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States. 
Article I, Section VII, Constitution of Utah. 
Article I, Section IX, Constitution of Utah. 
Article I, Section XII, Constitution of Utah. 
Article I, Section XXIV, Constitution of Utah. 
Rule 59 (a)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Section 78-13-9 (2) Utah Code Annotated. 
Section 76-6-412 Utah Code Annotated. 
Section 76-1-401 Utah Code Annotated. 
Rules 17, 18, 19, 24 and 29 (e)(i) and (ii) , Utah Ru 
Criminal Procedure. 
Rules 402, 403, 404(b), 701, 802, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.Nature of the Case: This is an appeal of rulings made 
preliminary to and at the course of a trial held in the Sixth 
Judicial Court of Wayne County, and from a denial of Post-trial 
Motions. Defendant/Appellant was charged with 8 separate counts 
of theft of cattle, and convicted by a jury on February 27, 1989. 
B.Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court: An 
information was filed by the Wayne County District Attorney 
charging the Defendant/Appellant with 8 separate counts of theft 
of cattle pursuant to Section 76-6-412, Utah Code Ann. Numerous 
Pre-trial Motions were made by both parties to the matter, the most 
significant of which for purposes of this appeal are the Motions 
for Change of Venue, to allege one third degree felony and to 
Suppress Evidence, all of said motions having been denied. The 
trial was conducted regularly except that bias of certain jurors 
were not revealed at voir dire, jurors were seen talking with the 
prosecution's key witness during the course of the trial, several 
exhibits and testimony were allowed over objection, and the 
Prosecutor made improper remarks in his closing argument. 
Defendant/Appellant was convicted by the jury on all 8 counts, was 
sentenced a fine of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00, Thirty-five 
Thousand ($35,000.00) of which was suspended), restitution in the 
amount of One Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars and Thirty-three Cents 
($1,717.33) , a suspended prison sentence, and one year in the Wayne 
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County Jail with probation. Defendant/Appellant's Motion for 
Arrest of Judgment based upon the late amendment to the information 
was denied, as was the Defendant/Appellantfs Motion for New Trial. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed with this Court on September 5, 
1989. 
C. Relevant Facts: 
1. On March 11, 1987, Defendant/Appellant brought 8 head of 
cattle to the Spanish Fork Livestock Auction for the purpose 
of selling them. See Trial Transcript page 191. 2. Ever 
since the Lindsays have been married, they have raised horses 
and cows. See page 166 of the Trial Transcript. 
3. The cows were utilized for the purpose of training horses. 
See page 167 of the Trial Transcript. 
4. The cattle were small, had long horns, did not have any 
tags, were unbranded, and had red sand on their back. See 
page 106 of the Trial Transcript. 
5. Mr. Argyle testified in the preliminary hearing that red 
sand could appear in three different regions in Utah. See 
Reply to State's Memorandum, Paragraph 4 at page 4 5 of the 
Record. 
6. Dependant/Appellant testified there was brownish red sand 
in and about his property. See page 224 of the Trial 
Transcript. 
7. Mr. A. C. Ekker testified that based on conversations with 
another party who was not present as a witness, it was his 
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opinion that the cattle were his. See page 86-87 of the Trial 
Transcript. 
8. Mr. Ekker never saw the cattle. See page 92 of the Trial 
Transcript. 
9. The sheriff of Wayne County is the cousin of the alleged 
victim. One of the jurors had worked for the alleged victim, 
and another juror was previously a law enforcement officer who 
had actually arrested one of the witnesses in the case, Don 
Hatch, for the identical things which the Defendant was found 
guilty. See Defendant/Appellant's Supplement for Motion for 
New Trial, paragraph 3 of page 250 of the Record. 
10. Two of the jurors conversed with A. C. Ekker during the 
course of the trial. See Trial Transcript, page 302 and 
Supplement to Motion for New Trial, paragraph 3 of page 250 
of the Record. 
11. The prosecution, despite repeated demands, failed to 
amend the information to allege the time of taking. See 
Response to Demand for Place, Date and Time of Offenses, pages 
60-61 of the Record. 
12. The prosecution, in closing, made improper remarks 
concerning prior criminal acts committed by 
Defendant/Appellant. See Supplement to Motion for New Trial 
page 249-252 of the Record, and Transcript of said Motion, 
page 18. 
13. The evidence in the trial indicated the ownership of the 
alleged stolen cattle was not the same as in the information, 
12 
but was a different entity. 
Transcript. 
14. The various objections 
certain exhibits and testimony 
appropriate arguments set fort 
See page 67 of the Trial 
made to the introduction of 
are cited to the Record in the 
1 below. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant/Appellant was wrongfully convicted by a biased jury 
some of whom had spoke to a prosecution's key witness during the 
course of the proceedings, for 8 separate counts of livestock theft 
of unbranded cattle. The information did not state the time of 
taking, and was amended late in the proceedings to include the true 
alleged owner of the unbranded cattle. Defendant/Appellant was 
somewhat of an outsider to the small ranching communities of Wayne 
County, there had been previous reports of thefts in the area, and 
word had spread about the community concerning the thefts making 
the formation of an impartial jury very difficult. Although the 
alleged theft constituted one criminal episode, Defendant/Appellant 
was denied equal protection under the law by being convicted on 8 
separate counts. Certain evidence was admitted over objection that 
alluded to other offenses which charges were dismissed by the 
Circuit Court, and certain hearsay, lay opinion and evidence 
without proper foundation was admitted over objection. The 
sentencing procedure was improper in that another Judge conducted 
the hearing and imposed the sentence, and may have wrongfully 
relied on evidence of other types of theft to excessively punish 
Defendant/Appellant as an example. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Change of Venue: Pursuant to Rule 29(e), U.R. Cr. Proc. 
Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion supported by Affidavit for 
Change of Venue. Loa is a very small, basically ranching 
community in Wayne County where the alleged victim was well known 
and respected. Defendant/Appellant was new to the area and was 
somewhat of an outsider. Previous thefts of cattle had been widely 
reported in the area, and was a cause of great concern in the 
ranching community. On voir dire, several of the jurors admitted 
hearing rumors about the thefts, one was dismissed because, based 
on the rumors, she thought the Defendant/Appellant was guilty, and 
many of the jurors had prior dealings with the Prosecutor. Given 
these factors, it was an abuse of discretion of the Trial Court not 
to grant the Motion for Change of Venue. 
A Motion for Change of Venue was extensively reviewed and 
granted in State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah, 1989). The Court 
labeled four factors to be taken into consideration: 
l.The standing of the victim and the accused in the Community; 
2.The size of the community; 
3.The nature and gravity of the offense; 
4.The nature and extent of publicity. 
The Court noted that it must "take the totality of the 
circumstances into account" (i.d. at P. 552). 
As previously stated, Defendant/Appellant was somewhat of an 
outsider, not having lived in the area for that many years, whereas 
the alleged victim was well respected in the community as belonging 
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to a cattle raising family for several generations. Immediately 
a presumption was raised in the community eyes that 
Defendant/Appellant must be guilty. 
Loa is a very small community consisting mostly of cattle and 
agricultural enterprises. The Court in James cited a U. S. Supreme 
Court Case, Nebraska Press Association vs. Stewart, 427 U. S. 539, 
49 L.Ed. 683 (1976) indicating the smaller the community the more 
likely there will be a need for a change in venue. The apparent 
bias of some of the jurors (argued supra), substantiates that a 
fair and impartial jury would be nearly impossible for a crime such 
as this in an agricultural community such as Loa. One of the 
jurors was a former employee of the alleged victim, another juror 
was a former police officer who arrested an alleged accomplice of 
Defendant/Appellant, and other jurors were friends of the alleged 
victim. The community the Court was considering in the James case 
was Logan, which is immensely more populous than the community at 
issue here. 
As to the nature and gravity of the offense, cattle theft in 
a community where much of its economic support is based on cattle 
raising becomes a much more serious offense than the total value 
of the alleged stolen property ($1,717.33) indicates. Even the 
prosecution in the sentencing argued that due to the geography of 
the area, which makes policing the cattle very difficult, it is 
indeed a serious offense. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, 
page 6. Mr. A. C. Ekker also testified at the sentencing hearing 
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indicating that such an offense should be taken very seriously (Id, 
pages 8 and 9) . 
As already stated, there had been previous thefts and trials 
concerning livestock thefts in the region, of which the whole 
community was aware of. Evidence was introduced to the Trial Court 
that a man who was present at the preliminary hearing was surprised 
to find that most people, including Court personnel, had already 
deemed Defendant/Appellant to be guilty. See Affidavit in Support 
of Motion to Change Venue, Pages 83-85 of the Record. Several of 
the jurors admit knowing of previous cattle thefts in the areas 
that, coupled with the fact that Defendant/Appellant did not have 
particularly high standing in the community, and was connected with 
a convicted cattle rustler, raised presumptions in most of the 
jurors minds that the Defendant/Appellant was guilty. 
The Court in James,finding all of the above factors present, 
ruled a Motion for Change of Venue should have been granted by the 
Trial Court, and it was an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court 
not to do so. A summary review of the trial transcript will show 
that this was small town justice, inflicted upon an outsider, and 
constitutes a violation of Defendant/Appellant's constitutional 
rights contained in Amendment VI to the Constitution of the United 
States, and Article I, Sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Constitution 
of Utah. 
II. Improper Admission of Opinion Testimony: On page 86 and 
87 of the Trial Transcript, A. C. Ekker testified over 
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Defendant/Appellant's objection, that based on conversations with 
another party who was not present as a witness, it was his opinion 
that the cattle were his. On page 92 of the transcript, Mr. Ekker 
indicated that opinion was based entirely upon what he was told by 
someone else and that he never saw the cattle. Similarly, Mr. 
Argyle testified on Page 108, over Defendant/Appellantfs objection, 
that it was his opinion that the cattle must have come from the 
Robbers Roost Allotment, although at the preliminary hearing, Mr. 
Argyle had testified red sand could have come from 3 different 
regions. See Reply to State's Memorandum, paragraph 4, at page 45 
of the Record. Mr. Argyle also indicated this opinion was based 
upon a conversation with another person who was not present as a 
witness, and that he had never seen cattle of this particular type 
before. Neither of these witnesses were certified as experts by 
the prosecution. 
Said opinions should have been excluded for two reasons, (1) 
they were based on hearsay; and (2) they went beyond the limited 
scope that Rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence imposes on lay 
opinions. Both witnesses testified their opinion was based on 
conversations with other persons who were available, but were not 
present in the Courtroom for cross examination. The fundamental 
principal behind the hearsay rule (Rule 802, Utah Rules of 
Evidence),is so an accusedfs rights to cross-examine witnesses will 
not be infringed upon. Both witnesses drew an inference as to 
where the cattle came from based on the mere unsubstantiated fact 
that there was red sand on the cattle. The Defendant/Appellant 
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gave testimony on page 227 of the Trial Transcript that the cattle 
were standing in reddish-brown sand. This Court should certainly 
take judicial notice that red sand appears in literally thousands 
of acres range land in different areas throughout the state and the 
region, and is not limited only to the vicinity of the Robbers 
Roost Allotment. 
In the matter of the Hockf s Estate, 655 P. 2d 1111, (Utah -
1982), the Court recognized that admission of evidence based on 
hearsay was error. Although the Court did find that it was 
harmless error, because it was not relevant to an ultimate issue 
in the case, in this matter it was extremely relevant as to where 
the cattle came from, because, as argued infra, the community 
including the jury were concerned with cattle thefts in the area 
and thought they were protecting one of its leading and respected 
cattle operators. A. C. Ekker was not even aware and did not 
report that any of this group of cattle were stolen. See Trial 
Transcript pages 77, 78. Certainly the opinions of an owner who had 
not even seen the cattle, and a brand inspector who admittedly 
based his opinion on the conversation with another man, 
constitutes prejudicial error requiring reversal. 
Rule 701 limits opinion testimony by lay witnesses to those 
which are: !l(a) rationally based on perception of the witness . . " 
Both the witnesses opinions were not rationally based on the 
perception of that witness, because they were admittedly based on 
conversations with other persons. In Edwards vs. Didericksen, 597 
P.2d 1328 (Utah, 1979) and in Highland Constr. Co. vs. Pac. R.R., 
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683 P.2d 1042 (Utah, 1984), the Court reaffirmed the rule that 
opinion testimony may not be based on hearsay evidence. The 
combined affect of both these witnesses opinions was prejudicial 
to Defendant/Appellant and again constitutes reversible error. 
III. Improper Admission of Business Records: On page 103 of 
the trial transcript Defendant/Appellant objected to the admission 
of Plaintiff's Exhibit Number Two, in that it was a business record 
from a company that the witness was not an employee of and had no 
personal knowledge of. State vs. Bertul, 664 P. 2d 1181 (Utah, 
1983) held that for evidence to be admissible as a business record 
a proper foundation must be laid to establish the necessary 
induciae of reliability, which foundation should generally include 
the following: 
The record must be made in the regular course of the 
business or entity which keeps the records; the record 
must have been made at the time of, or in close proximity 
to, the occurrence of a conclusion that after recordation 
the document was kept under circumstances that would 
preserve its integrity; the sources of the information 
from which the entry was made and the circumstances of 
the preparation of the document were such that to suggest 
its trustworthiness. 
There can be no question that Mr. Argyle could not possibly 
testify to all of those factors required by Bertul. The Court 
stated no reason for overruling Defendant/Appellant's objection. 
Clearly there was lack of proper foundation for admitting Exhibit 
Number Two, but if the Court finds the admission alone was 
insufficient to cause prejudicial error, the Court must keep in 
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mind that the combined affect of all the errors pointed out in this 
brief warrant a reversal of the conviction. See also Gold 
Laboratories Inc. vs. Lewis A. Rosar Co., 589 P.2d. 756 (Utah, 
1978). 
IV. Irrelevant and Prejudicial Testimony: On page 83 of the 
trial transcript, A. C. Ekker, over objection, testified as to 
previously reporting other cattle thefts, and that others have been 
apprehended for cattle rustling. Being such a small community, it 
was well known that Don Hatch, with whom it was widely rumored that 
Defendant/Appellant was a co-conspirator, was previously convicted 
of cattle rustling from the same area. Those questions allowed 
over objection gave rise to an inference that if Don Hatch was 
guilty then certainly the Defendant/Appellant was guilty. Such 
improper inference brought about by irrelevant and misleading 
questions was extremely prejudicial, and warrants reversal. 
Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence preclude the 
introduction of irrelevant evidence, and evidence whose probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice 
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. In Pearce vs. 
Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah,1985), the Court stated, 
where evidence was shown to have supported only 
conjectural inferences which had little probative value, 
or where no evidence was introduced that showed that fact 
had any causal connection with Plaintiff's injury, 
reviewing Courts have reversed cases on grounds that they 
improperly admitted evidence could only have served to 
confuse or mislead the jury or prejudice the outcome of 
the case (citations omitted). 
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The Court engaged in thorough analysis of balancing the probative 
value against undue prejudice, citing Carlson vs. Piper Aircraft 
Corp. , 646 P.2d 43 (OR, 1982) and Patricia R. vs. Sulivan, 631 P.2d 
91 (Alaska,1981), and concluded: "the instant case was similarly 
fraught with the danger of dogmatic judgment." A small town jury 
was eager to protect themselves and their community from cattle 
rustling, and when reminded of previous convictions and reports of 
cattle theft, would tend to link the prior instances to 
Defendant/Appellants conduct and thereby raise the inference of 
guilt. State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah, 1984), which ruled 
that the introduction of evidence concerning a prior robbery 
committed by the Defendant twenty minutes before his arrest for 
theft, was of margin probative value and unduly prejudicial. In 
accordance, State v. DeAllo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), and 
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The Court compounded its error on the second defense counsel's 
objection to evidence of prior apprehensions by stating at page 84 
of the trial transcript: "Well the answer is already on the record. 
The objection is overruled." A judge could have, and should have 
instructed the jury to disregard the answer and sustained the 
objection. The Court in Pearce also admonished the trial judge for 
failing to make a distinction to the jury, and by overruling an 
objection to testimony. The Court, in analyzing whether the 
admitted testimony had a substantial influence in bringing about 
the verdict stated: "The jury's verdict could well have been the 
result of shifting it's attention away from the facts of the case 
22 
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 The misleading inference that was raised by the 
prosecutor's questions and the witnesses answers that 
Defendant/Appellant was connected with a prior convicted cattle 
rustler, definitely creates undue prejudice which outweighed the 
evidences minor probative value. Since very little other direct 
evidence was introduced indicating the cattle came from the Robbers 
Roost Allotment evidence of prior reports and apprehensions from 
said Allotment compounded the prejudicial affect, and was a 
substantial influence in bringing about the verdict.1 
V. Improper Admission of Evidence and Improper Remarks by the 
Prosecutor of Prior Bad Acts and Offenses: At page 115 of the 
Trial Transcript the prosecution submitted Exhibits Four and Five 
into evidence over Defendant/Appellant's objection. These 
Exhibits were the basis of a forgery and uttering of false 
documents charge that was dismissed by the Circuit Court. In 
responding to Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Suppress Said 
Evidence, the prosecution stated it will not be submitted as 
The Court should keep in mind the only direct evidence 
submitted by the prosecution of where the cattle came from was that 
they were skinny and there was red sand on them. The alleged owner 
never even saw the cattle, and that the lay opinions of the 
prosecution witnesses were based on hearsay. 
2
 Upon my review of the Court record in this case, the Court 
should be put on notice that the Exhibits appear to have been mis-
marked and are incomplete. Defendant/Appellant's Exhibit Number 
Nine is missing, Exhibits Three and Six are missing, but what the 
transcript refers to as Exhibits Four and Five are marked Exhibits 
Three and Four. Exhibit Seven has been marked Exhibit Five and a 
copy that is also marked as Exhibit Six. 
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evidence of bad character. See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
to Suppress at pages 118 and 119 of the Record. 
The preceding testimony of Mr. Argyle had indicated 
Defendant/Appellant purporting to be a friend of himself stated 
that the cattle were obtained by trade with the Indians. See Trial 
Transcript, page 113. Therefore the introduction of Exhibits Four 
and Five indicated to the jury that Defendant/Appellant may have 
been of bad character, by changing his story as to the origin of 
the cattle and by forging Bills of Sale. This indication was 
compounded further by the improper remarks in the prosecutorfs 
closing statements that "not only is he guilty of this crime, but 
he is guilty of other crimes." See supplement to Motion for New 
Trial, paragraph five, at page 251 of the record. Since closing 
arguments are limited to matters that have been presented to the 
jury, the prosecutor must have been referring to the allegedly 
forged Bills of Sale that were introduced as Exhibits Four and 
Five, or the prior conviction of Don Hatch that Defendant/Appellant 
was rumored to be an accomplice with. 
In State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d, 1368 (Utah 1986), the Court 
reversed and remanded a conviction based on improper prosecutorfs 
argument that referred to prior convictions and that demonstrated 
Defendant's criminal character. The Court cited State v. Troy, 688 
P.2d, 483 (Utah 1984), which case in turn applied the two prong 
test set forth in State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973). The 
two prong test is whether the remarks called to the attention of 
the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering 
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in determining their verdict, and that under circumstances of the 
particular case the jury was probably influenced by those remarks. 
The Prosecutor's remark that Defendant/Appellant was guilty 
of other crimes would definitely not be permissible for the jury 
to consider in determining it's verdict as being violative of Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Given the weak direct 
evidence of ownership of the cattle in question, and no evidence 
of the time of the alleged theft of the cattle, the Prosecutor's 
remarks probably did influence the jury by bringing their attention 
to a prior criminal conviction of cattle rustling in which 
Defendant/Appellant was apparently an accomplice. When applying 
the second prong of the test, the Court in Tarafa stated, "the 
substantive use of Defendant's prior bad acts and felonies added 
greatly to the likelihood that the jury inferred guilty knowledge 
from the character of Defendant." The Court in Troy stated, 
similar to this case where there was not compelling proof of 
Defendant's guilty, and that the jury could have found either way, 
that they are compelled to find that the second step of the Valdez, 
test has been met. The jurors "Probably were influenced by" 
remarks of the Prosecutor. Similarly to those cases, the improper 
remarks of the Prosecutor and the introduction of Bills of Sale 
that were allegedly forged or altered could probably have 
influenced the jury and is grounds for a reversal of the conviction 
in this matter. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides "evidence 
of other claims, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
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character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith." In State v. Sanders, 699 P.2d 738, (Utah 1985), the 
court stated, 
Evidence of prior crimes is presumed prejudicial and, 
absent no reason for the admission of the evidence other 
than to settle criminal disposition, the evidence is 
excluded. 
See State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015, (Utah 1978), where the Court 
stated, "Specific instances of misconduct that did not result in 
criminal convictions are inadmissible to impeach the witness." 
Evidence of a prior dismissed criminal complaint that followed 
testimony which was contradictory as to the origin of the cattle, 
and referred to as guilt of other crimes by the Prosecutor in his 
closing arguments, was a blatant attack on Defendant/Appellant's 
character, and in violation of Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
VI. Jury Bias and improper Conduct: The trial judge 
conducted its own voir dire of the jury, and at page 49 of the 
Trial Transcript, upon defense counsel's suggestion, the Court 
asked the Prosecutor and defense counselor to state their 
witnesses, and then asked if the jurors had any relationship 
between any of those witnesses. There was no response from the 
jury. Defendant/Appellant's counsel learned after the trial that 
one of the jurors had in fact worked for one of the key witnesses 
in the case, A. C. Ekker, and that another juror had previously 
been a law enforcement officer who had actually arrested one of the 
witnesses in the case, Don Hatch, for the identical offense for 
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which this Defendant was found guilty. See Defendant/Appellantfs 
Supplement for Motion for New Trial, paragraph three at page 250 
of the record. The Defendant/Appellant's counsel states in said 
motion that had voir dire been properly conducted, and that 
information disclosed, he would have asserted his pre-emptory 
challenge or challenge for cause on at least one if not both of 
those jurors. Defendant was ready to put on evidence concerning 
the bias of the jurors but was not allowed to. See Transcript of 
Motion for New Trial, etc., page 35. This issue was not even 
addressed in the Findings of FAct and Order Denying Motion in 
Arrest for Judgment and Motion for a New Trial found at page 257-
259 of the record. 
One of the fundamental principles of our system of justice 
which is guaranteed by both the United States and Utah State 
Constitutions, is the right of an accused to a fair and impartial 
jury. Due process also requires proper conduct of the 
judge, jury, and counsel during trial. In addition to the bias of 
two of the jurors mentioned above, some of the jurors apparently 
were friendly with A. C. Ekker and conversed with him during one 
of the recesses of the trial. See Trial Transcript page 302 and 
Supplement to Motion for New Trial, paragraph three, at page 250 
of the record. 
In State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah, 1977), the Court 
stated that a showing of friendship between two jurors and the main 
prosecution witness was a sufficient showing of actual bias. In 
State v. Errickson, 674 P.2d (Utah, 1987), the Court stated 
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reversal of conviction and remand of case for new trial was 
required where a four or five minute conversation took place 
between juror and key witness for state. . ." And in State v. 
Pike, 712 P. 2d 277 (Utah 1985), it was stated: "conversation 
between important prosecution witness, . . . was sufficient to 
warrant a presumption of prejudice on the part of the jurors 
justifying reversal of conviction, even if jurors had denied they 
influenced by the encounter in a Post Trial Hearing." Finally in 
State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah, 1983), the Court 
reiterated the general rule that Defendant is entitled to fair and 
impartial trial based on evidence presented to jury, without jury 
being influenced by information from outside sources." These line 
of cases show there is a high degree of protection concerning jury 
bias and misconduct. This coupled with the argument why grounds 
exist for a change of venue and the prosecutions very weak evidence 
concerning ownership of the cattle, requires reversal of the 
conviction. 
VII. Unconstitutionality of Section 76-6-412: This Statute 
places theft of animals regardless of their value as a third degree 
felony. Although in historical times theft of livestock was 
considered a much more serious crime and there were compelling 
reasons for creating a special class for such thefts, 
Defendant/Appellant contends those conditions no longer exists, and 
to continue to classify theft of livestock as a third degree felony 
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is creating a class that is unreasonable, arbitrary and 
discriminatory. 
The evidence of this case show that there are modern day 
protections, i.e. the Brand Inspectors Office, that negates the 
need for a special classification for a theft such as this. The 
test of a Statute for purposes of equal protection is that the 
Statute must be grounded upon a rational basis, McGowan v. Marilyn, 
366 U.S. 420, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 6L Ed. 2d 393 (1961). There is not 
a rational basis for distinguishing between a theft of a cow from 
a barn, for example, and theft of a piece of equipment from the 
barn of comparable value. The standard for finding the value of 
personal property and determine the degree of theft is the market 
value of the stolen items. State v. Logan, 563 P. 2d 811 (Utah, 
1977). There is no longer a rational basis for classifying theft 
of livestock as a third degree felony regardless of value, whereas 
all other types of theft are categorized on the basis of value. 
Although this issue was addressed and denied in State v. Clark, 632 
P.2d 841 (Utah, 1981), Defendant/Appellant contends that given the 
modern safeguards that apply to the livestock industry, there no 
longer exists a rational basis for the discriminatory 
classification, and State v. Clark should be overruled. 
VIII. Requirement of Original: The State's exhibits three 
and six were admitted, over Defendant/Appellant's objection, even 
though they were admittedly copies of the original, and the witness 
testified that the originals were easily obtainable. See Trial 
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Transcript pages 110 and 111. The witness stated in response to 
the prosecutors question if he had access to the originals that: 
"They have allowed me to do it. I could get a Court Order if I 
needed to, but the Auction Company allowed me to and they helped 
me find them in fact." (id. page 111 lines 2 through 5). 
Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires to prove the 
content of a witting the original is required. Exceptions to this 
rule are contained in Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, but 
none of those exceptions apply, in fact, the witness testified he 
could have easily obtained the original. Further there was no 
authentication of who made the copies elicited from the witness. 
If the Court finds the admission of this evidence was error, but 
of no prejudicial affect, the combined affect of this error with 
all others argued in this brief warrants a reversal. 
IX. Insufficiency of and Variance of Information: Not only 
was there little direct evidence as to the ownership of the cattle 
or where it was taken, but the State also failed to provide direct 
evidence as to when the cattle were allegedly taken. Although 
Defendant/Appellant concedes the exact time need not be specific, 
Defendant/Appellant contends that there is a violation of his due 
process rights to not have the State prove with some degree of 
specificity the approximately time of taking. This is particularly 
true in light of the fact that Defendant/Appellant filed a Notice 
of Alibi indicating that he was not in the area prior to the 
alleged time of taking. 
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In McGuire v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321, (Utah 1983), the Court 
stated, 
time is always an essential element of a crime in the 
sense that due process requires that an accused be given 
sufficient precise notification of the date of the 
alleged crime that he can prepare his defense. 
The Court cited the United States Constitution Amendments V and 
XIV. When there was weak evidence of direct ownership, weak 
evidence as to where the cattle came from, and a Notice of Alibi 
filed with the Court, (see Notice of Alibi, pages 75-78 of the 
Record), the information was fatally defective for not setting 
forth the time of taking, and the State failed to prove said time 
during the trial. Such failure of proof warrants reversal of 
Defendant/Appellantf s conviction. 
Defendant/Appellant was also severely prejudiced by the State 
alleging in the information that the owner of the cattle was A. C. 
Ekker, when proof at trial indicated ownership of the cattle was 
really in a corporation called the Cross X Cattle Company. The 
defense had hired an investigator to investigate A. C. Ekker, not 
Cross X Cattle Company. See page 5 of the Transcript for Motion 
for New Trial, etc. In State v. Burnett, 712 P2d. 260 (Utah, 1985) 
involved a very similar situation where evidence showed that the 
theft was from someone other than that charged in the information. 
The Court said there plainly was a variance between the specifics 
of the crime charged in the information and the crime which the 
Court permitted the jury to convict. The Court reversed, stating 
the defense was not put on notice of the ownership and therefore 
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was prejudiced in the preparation of the defense. This was the 
argument the Motion For Arrest of Judgment, and said argument is 
set forth on pages 6, 7 and 8 of the Transcript denying said 
motion. 
X. Separate Offenses: Defendant/Appellant was charged with 
8 separate counts of theft of cattle, although the Prosecution 
failed to put on any evidence of different facts or elements of 
proof for each count. Multiplicity has not been extensively 
addressed in the Utah Courts, however, the Kansas Courts have 
reviewed and defined the term. In State v. Wilson, 728 P.2d 1332, 
(Kan. App. 1986) , the Court stated: "multiplicity in criminal 
action is charging of single offense in several counts." State v. 
Jackson, 543 P.2d 901, (Kan. 1975), the Court stated: "test to be 
applied in determining the identity of offenses is whether it 
requires proof of fact which is not required by others." In 
accord, see State v. Pierce, 469 P.2d 308 (Kan. 1970). This test 
was further refined in State v. Hicks, 714 P. 2d 105, (Kan. App. 
1986), where the Court stated: 
test to determine whether charges are in fact 
multiplicitious is whether one offense requires proof of 
element not necessary to prove other offenses; if so, 
charges stemming from single act are not multipicitious. 
Finally, the Kansas Appellant Court stated in State v. Hill,706 
P.2d 472, (Kan. App.1985), 
Multiplicity which is charging of a single offense in 
several counts is prohibited because a single wrongful 
act cannot furnish basis for more than one criminal 
prosecution. 
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Section 76-1-401 Utah Code Ann. states: 
single criminal episode means all conduct which is 
closely related in time and is significant to an attempt 
or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
In State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203, (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
retention of stolen property of different individuals 
is a single act and a single offense where evidence shows 
that the items were retained simultaneously. 
The Supreme Court reversed a conviction on the grounds that 
Defendant had previously been tried for the same criminal episode, 
and the Court undertook a thorough review of opinions concerning 
the issue of whether a single criminal episode or separate offenses 
occurred. The Court cited State v. Clark, 497 P.2d 1210, (Or. 
1972), where that Court states: 
if the State contended that the articles were received 
or concealed by the Defendant on separate occasions, it 
was incumbent upon it to offer evidence to that affect. 
It did not do so. 
The Utah Court in Bair concluded the State did not establish that 
Defendant received the stolen property on separate occasions. 
Similarly here, there was no evidence that the cattle was taken at 
different times in fact, as argued infra, the State failed to 
specifically allege the date of taking. 
Defendant/Appellant is prejudiced by being charge with 
multiple counts, and thereby face up to 8 times the amount of fines 
and amount of possible jail time. This was argued by 
Defendant/Appellant in his Motion to Allege One Third Degree 
Felony, (see Record, pages 90-93) and in his Motion to Dismiss made 
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at trial, at page 155 of the Trial Transcript. There it was 
pointed out that the same Prosecutor had previously prosecuted 
and assisted in the conviction of a witness of 
Defendant/Appellant, Don Hatch, and in that case, there were 7 head 
of cattle taken, only one count charged. Defense counsel also 
points out on page 156 that historically every record in that 
particular County contained only one charge. Grounds exist for a 
reversal or at least a remand of this matter to be properly tried 
under one count in absence of proof of separate facts or elements. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant's conviction was based on heresay 
evidence, innuendo, and as a result of a biased jury. The 
prosecution did not prove where the cattle were taken, when the 
cattle were taken, or who the cattle were taken from. The only 
slim evidence of where the cattle were taken was the mere presence 
of red sand on the cattle, and the alleged victim never even saw 
the cattle. Evidence as to prior apprehensions and reports of 
cattle thefts from the alleged victim was improperly admitted 
before the jury, and the jury improperly inferred that the 
conviction of Don Hatch, who was rumored to be an accomplice with 
Defendant/Appellant, meant Defendant/Appellant must be guilty. For 
these reasons, plus other arguments set forth in the brief, 
Defendants conviction should be reversed. 
In the event this Court does not feel reversal of the 
conviction is appropriate, the following reasons constitutes 
grounds for at least a remand of the matter and a new trial. 
Defendant/Appellant was improperly charged and sentenced with 8 
counts of cattle theft, rather than a single count; heresay, lay 
opinion, and evidence without foundation was improperly admitted 
over objection; jurors conversed with the witness during the course 
of the proceedings; and improper remarks by the prosecution 
prejudiced Defendant/Appellant. 
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As argued above, numerous sound reasons exist for reversal of 
Defendant/Appellant's conviction, or in the very least, a remand 
for a new trial before an unbiased jury. 
Respectively submitted this QX day of ^-^ Lb^Uu &/-^ ^ > 1990, 
Phil Hansen 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provision* concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, ur in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the ntfht to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury ot the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. ICitizenship — Due process of law — Equal protec-
tion.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. (Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be 
paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. ISM 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel pun-
ishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines 
shall not be imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted Persons arrested or impris-
oned shall not be treated with unnecessary ngor. 
1SS6 
8ec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behali, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himseii, a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her bus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the sam* offense. 
list 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation am 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment, 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the follow-
ing causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a 
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court 
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and con* 
elusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of Ihe jury, and whenever any 
one or more of the jurors have been induced to 
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the 
court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary pru-
dence could not have guarded against 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he could 
not, with reabonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appear-
ing to have been given under the influence of 
panbion or prejudice 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial 
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry 
of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the applica-
tion for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), 
(2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affi-
davits they shall be served with the motion. The op-
posing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within 
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be 
served may be extended for an additional period not 
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause 
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The 
court may permit reply affidavits. 
id) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative 
may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, 
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A mo-
tion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served 
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
78-13-9. Grounds. 
The court may, on motion, change the place of trial 
in the following cases: 
(1) when the county designated in the com-
plaint is not the proper county. 
(2) when there is reason to believe that an im-
partial trial cannot be had in the county, city, or 
precinct designated in the complaint. 
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the 
ends of justice would be promoted by the change. 
(4) when all the parties to an action, by stipu-
lation or by consent in open court entered in the 
minutes, agree that the place of trial may be 
changed to another county. Thereupon the court 
must order the change as agreed upon. itos 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — 
Action for treble damages against re-
ceiver of stolen property. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in 
this chapter shall be punishable as follows: 
(a) As a felony of the second degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services 
exceeds $1,000; or 
(ii) The property stolen is a firearm or an 
operable motor vehicle; or 
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly 
weapon at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) The property is stolen from the person 
of another. 
(b) As a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services is 
more than $250 but not more than $1,000; or 
(ii) The actor has been twice before con-
victed of theft of property or services valued 
at $250 or less; or 
(iii) When the property taken is a stallion, 
mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, 
bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, 
swine, or poultry. 
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of 
the property stolen was more than $100 but does 
not exceed $250. 
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of 
the property stolen was $100 or less. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation 
of Subsection (1), of Section 76-6-408 may bring an 
action against any person mentioned in (d) for three 
times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained 
by the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attor-
neys' fees. ii77 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-1-401. "Single cr iminal ep i sode" defined — 
J o i n d e r of offense* and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different 
definition, "single criminal episode" means all con-
duct which is closely related in time and is incident to 
an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or 
modify the effect of Section 77-21-31 in controlling 
the joinder of olfenses and defendants in criminal pro-
ceedings. 1976 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
-35-17. Rule 17 — The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right 
appear and defend in person and by counsel. The 
fendant shall be personally present at the trial 
ith the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and in* 
fractions, defendant may consent in writing to 
trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable 
by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from 
the trial after notice to defendant of the time for 
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried 
and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall 
have the same effect as if defendant had been 
present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defen-
dant from trial for good cause shown which may 
include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous con-
duct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may 
'quite the perbonal attendance of the defendant at 
ie trial 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be 
*ied in the following order: 
(1) Misdemeanor cases when defendant is in 
custody; 
(2) Felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) Felony cases when defendant is on bail or 
recognizance; and 
(4) Misdemeanor cases when defendant is on 
bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the 
L'fendant waives a jury in open court with the ap-
roval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
id) All other cases shall be tried without a jury 
nless the defendant makes written demand at least 
*n days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise, 
o jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial 
try shall be as specified in Section 78-46-5. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, 
ith the consent of the accused and the approval of 
ie court, by stipulation in writing or made orally in 
>en court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in 
-ogress with any number of jurors less than other-
ise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, 
the trial shall proceed in the following order: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the 
defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an 
opening statement and the defense may make an 
opening statement or reserve it until the prosecu-
tion has rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in sup-
port of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the de-
fense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only re-
butting evidence unless the court, for good cause, 
otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any 
other appropriate time, the court shall instruct 
the jury, and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury 
on either side or on both sides without argument, 
the prosecution shall open the argument, the de-
fense shall follow and the prosecution may close 
by responding to the defense argument. The 
court may set reasonable limits upon the argu-
ment of counsel for each party and the time to be 
allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified 
during trial and an alternate juror has been selected, 
the case shall proceed using the alternate juror. If no 
alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate 
to proceed with the number of jurors remaining. Oth-
erwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial 
ordered. 
(I) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for 
the jury to view the place in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, or in which any 
other material fact occurred, it may order them to be 
conducted in a body under the charge of an officer to 
the place, which shall be shown to them by some per-
son appointed by the court for that purpose. The offi-
cer shall be sworn that while the jury are thus con-
ducted, he will suffer no person other than the person 
so appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on 
any subject connected with the trial and to return 
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them into court without unnecessary delay or at a 
specified time 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors 
are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they 
shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty 
not to converse among themselves or to converse 
with, or sufler themselves to be addressed by, any 
other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon 
until the case is finally submitted to them. 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may 
take with them the instructions of the court and all 
exhibits and papers which have been received as evi-
dence, except depositions, and each juror may also 
take with him any notes of the testimony or other 
proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any 
other person 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, 
they shall be kept together in some convenient place 
under charge of an officer until they agree upon a 
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by 
the court Except by order of the court, the officer 
having them under his charge shall not allow any 
communication to be made to them, or make any him-
self, except to ask them if they have agreed upon 
their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is 
rendered, communicate to any person the state of 
their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon 
(m) After the jury hab retired for deliberation, if 
they desire to be informed on any point of law arising 
in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of 
them, who shall communicate such request to the 
court The court may then direct that the jury be 
brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond 
to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further in-
structions shall be given Such response shall be re-
corded The court may in its discretion respond to the 
inquiry in writing without having the jury brought 
before the court, in which case the inquiry and re-
sponse thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on 
its face, it may be corrected by the jury under the 
advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again. 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prose-
cution, or at the conclusion of all of the evidence, the 
court may issue an order dismissing any information 
or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground 
that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish 
the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
offense. iwt 
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7-35-18. Rule 18 Selection of jury. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number 
f the jurors that are to try the cause plus such an 
idditional number as will allow for all peremptory 
hallenges permitted. After each challenge for cause 
ustained, another juror shall be called to Till the va-
ancy before further challenges are made, and any 
uch new juror may be challenged for cause. When 
he challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
hall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each 
ide, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate 
hereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a 
mie in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all 
>eremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
lerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many 
>f them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, in 
he order in which they appear on the list, and the 
Ksraons whose names are so called shall constitute 
he jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant 
o conduct the examination of the prospective jurors 
>r may itaelf conduct the examination. In the latter 
;vent, the court may permit counsel or the defendant 
o supplement the examination by such further in-
[uiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the 
irospective jurors additional questions requested by 
ounsel or the defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an 
^dividual juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve 
at a particular court or for the trial of a particu-
lar action. A challenge to the panel is an objec-
tion made to all jurors summoned and may be 
taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded 
only on a material departure from the proce-
dure prescribed with respect to the selection, 
drawing, summoning and return of the 
panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be 
taken before the jury is sworn and shall be in 
writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall 
specifically set forth the facts constituting 
the grounds of the challenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed 
by the adverse party, a hearing may be had 
to try any question of fact upon which the 
challenge is based. The jurors challenged, 
and any other persons, may be called as wit-
nesses at the hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. 
If the challenge to the panel is allowed, the 
court shall discharge the jury so far as the 
trial in question is concerned. If a challenge 
is denied, the court shall direct the selection 
of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be 
either peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an 
individual juror may be made only before the 
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court 
may, for good cause, permit it to be made alter 
the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence 
is presented. In challenges for cause the rules 
relating to challenges to a panel and hearings 
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause 
shall be taken first by the prosecution and then 
by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a ju-
ror for which no reason need be given. In capital 
cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory chal-
lenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to 
four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases, 
each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. 
If there is more than one defendant the court may 
allow the defendants additional peremptory chal-
lenges and permit them to be exercised separately or 
jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a par-
ticular juror and may be taken on one or more of the 
following grounds: 
(1) Want of any of the qualifications pre-
scribed by law; 
(2) Any mental or physical infirmity which 
renders one incapable of performing the duties of 
a juror; 
(3) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth 
degree to the person alleged to be injured by the 
offense charged, or on whose complaint the prose-
cution was instituted; 
(4) The existence of any social, legal, business, 
fiduciary or other relationship between the pro-
spective juror and any party, witness or person 
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the 
defendant, which relationship when viewed ob-
jectively, would auggeat to reasonable minds that 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwill-
ing to return a verdict which would be free of 
favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be dis-
qualified solely because he is indebted to or em-
ployed by the state or a political subdivision 
thereof; 
(6) Having been or being the party adverse to 
the defendant in a civil action, or having com-
plained against or having been accused by him in 
a criminal prosecution; 
(6) Having served on the grand jury which 
found the indictment; 
(7) Having served on a trial jury which has 
tried another person for the particular offense 
charged; 
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(8) Having been one of a jury formally sworn 
to try the same charge, and whose verdict was set 
aside, or which was discharged without a verdict 
after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) Having served as a juror in a civil action 
brought against the defendant for the act 
charged as an offense; 
(10) If the offense charged is punishable with 
death, the entertaining of such conscientious 
opinions about the death penalty as would pre-
clude the juror from voting to impose the death 
penalty following conviction regardless of the 
facts; 
(11) Because he is or, within one year preced-
ing, has been engaged or interested in carrying 
on any buniness, calling or employment, the car-
rying on of which is a violation of law, where the 
defendant is charged with a like offense; 
(12) Because he has been a witness, either for 
or against the defendant on the preliminary ex-
amination or before the grand jury; 
(13) Having formed or expressed an unquali-
fied opinion or belief as to whether the defendant 
is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part of 
the juror with reference to the cause, or to either 
party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial 
rights of the party challenging; but no person 
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of hav-
ing formed or expressed an opinion upon the mat-
ter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded 
upon public rumor, statements in public journals 
or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears 
to the court that the juror can and will, notwith-
standing such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
(0 Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by 
the prosecution and then by the defense alternately. 
Challenges for cause shall be completed before pe-
remptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be 
impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which 
they are called, shall replace jurors, who are, or be-
come, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. 
The prosecution and defense shall each have one ad-
ditional peremptory challenge for each alternate ju-
ror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, 
take the same oath and enjoy the same privileges a* 
regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is 
a privilege of the person exempted and is not a 
ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be ad-
ministered to the jurorB, in substance, that they and 
each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
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77-35-19. Rule 1» Instruction*. 
(a) At the clone of the evidence or at such earlier 
time as the court reasonably directs, any party may 
file written request that the court instruct the jury on 
the law as set forth in the request. At the same time 
copies of such requests shall be furnished to the other 
parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed 
action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel 
with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the 
parties stipulate that such instructions may be given 
orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and 
given, or refused, the court shall endorse its decision 
and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the 
endorsement what part of the charge was given and 
what part was refused. 
(cj No party may assign as error any portion of the 
charge or omission therefrom unless he objects 
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly 
the matter to which he objects and the ground of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, 
error may be assigned to instructions in order to 
avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in 
the case, and if the court refers to any of the evidence, 
it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive 
judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be 
made after the court has instructed the jury. Unless 
otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon tim« 
for argument shall be within the discretion of the 
court. IMO 
77-36-24. Rule 24 — Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon 
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had 
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a 
party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writ-
ing and upon notice. The motion shall be accompa-
nied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to 
procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone 
the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems 
reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 
10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such 
further time as the court may fix during the ten day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in 
the same position as if no trial had been held and the 
former verdict shall not be URPII nr m«»nt irk™**rf «*;*k<*-
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77-35-29. Rule 29 — Disability and disquali-
fication of a judge or change of venue, 
(e) (i) If the prosecution or a defendant in a crimi-
nal action believes that a fair and impartial trial 
cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the ac-
tion is pending, either may, by motion, supported 
by an affidavit setting foith facts, ask to have the 
trial of the case transferred to another jurisdic-
tion. 
(ii) If the court te satisfied that the representa-
tions made in the affidavit are true and justify 
transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order 
for tiie removal of the case to the court of another 
jurisdiction free from the objection and all 
records pertaining to the case shall be trans-
ferred forthwith to the court in the other county. 
If the court is not satisfied that the representa-
tions so made justify transfer of the case, the 
court shall either enter an order denying the 
transfer or order a formal hearing in court to 
resolve the matter and receive further evidence 
with respect to the alleged prejudice. 
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Rule 402. Relevant evidence general ly admissi-
ble; i r re levant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as oth-
erwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, stat-
ute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in 
courts of this state Evidence which is not relevant is 
not admissible 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or 
waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cu-
mulative evidence 
Rule 404. Charac te r evidence not admissible to 
prove conduct ; exceptions; other 
crimes. 
(hi Other crimes, wrongs, or acts . Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
piove the character oi n person in order to show that 
he dUed in conformity therewith It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident 
Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his 
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is lim-
ited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) ra-
tionally based on the perception of the witness and (b) 
helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or 
the determination of a fact in issue. 
Rule 602. Hearsay rule . 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by 
law or by these rules 
